It is clear that air traffic management (ATM) across the globe is changing and changing rapidly. For the past several decades ATM has remained fairly constant and while changes have occurred they have been evolutionary. However, changes that are on the anvil are revolutionary and transformational.
Regardless of whether its NextGen in the US, or SESAR in Europe or CARATS in Japan, air traffic management is about to change permanently. Each of these programs has multiple tracks and while each of these programs gives these tracks different labels, there are many similarities in their goals. Efficient flight routing, fuels savings, noise abatement, balancing separation and safety, minimizing weather impact, shifting the dependence on voice communications are examples of the goals of these initiatives.
Its evident that with such a vast slew of changes, there will be impacts from a human factors perspective. A wide variety of tests are in progress to determine the totality of these impacts. The role of the human within the operation will change. Whether its providing clearances or issuing instructions through voice communications, the role of the individual is up for change. Air traffic is increasing rapidly. Passenger volumes are on the rise. ATM is in dire need of change. The dependence on the individual is here to stay for a long time, however, the system can be designed to help rather than burden the individual. One observation that can be drawn from the videos is that ATM may be at risk of experiencing the same type of issues that aircrafts went through when large scale transformations were introduced. One of those examples is flight deck automation. While the autopilot and FMS were valuable additions to the flight deck, they brought along with them several new risks. Some of those risks continue to materialize several years after those innovations were introduced.
It is not difficult to envision these types of risks when ADS-B, ERAM, Digital Voice, Performance-based Navigation or any of the other tracks in NextGen bring major changes to ATM. All of these change programs will bring relief to roles within ATM while also bringing on new challenges.
References:
Federal Aviation Administration. (2016, May 3). FAA TV: NextGen: See, Navigate & Communicate. Retrieved from www.faa.gov: https://www.faa.gov/tv/?mediaId=1332
JAXA | 宇宙航空研究開発機構]. (2014, March 6). Next generation air-traffic management system “DREAMS”. Retrieved from
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8WvVfDqVKes (Links to an external site.)
[SESAR]. (2014, February 12). SESAR Solutions explained. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7shT5W_rI1Q
Author: cjois
Aviation Moment
Aviation Human Factors and Prospective Memory
Prospective memory is an emerging area of research within the field of Cognitive Psychology and Human Factors. Remembering to perform intended actions can be critical, especially in safety-related occupations like Air Traffic Control.
Failures in prospective memory (PM) are the reason why we fail to perform intended or required actions. There is increasing interest in the topic of prospective memory and the reasons for failures of such memory. While this subject is still under intense debate, according to one school of thought, prospective memory recall is driven by the process of monitoring. Another view is that it occurs as part of spontaneous retrieval. In either case, the intention for the planned task is retrieved which then allows for action. Distractions are one source of why action is forgotten.
Interruptions of any kind can be a cause (Shorrock, 2005; Sternberg & Sternberg, 2016). A telephone call or request for information can be sufficient cause to not return back to the ongoing task. The variety of peripheral tasks that controllers need to perform often conflict with the primary task of maintaining separation. Such tasks could include scanning displays, accepting aircraft, gathering and relaying weather advisories and responding to pilot requests.
Prospective memory recall is predicated on cues. A cue or trigger is necessary for prospective memory to work. As described earlier, to recall the intent, the human mind constantly polls for such items. When polling is not invested in, such as when we are preoccupied with other task(s), then the intent is not recalled and action is termed as ‘forgotten’. Under another school of thought, spontaneous retrieval occurs on account of a system within our brain that causes automatic retrieval of items at the appropriate times. Once again, when tasks preoccupy, spontaneity drops and we tend to forget the intent. Proximity, recency and task regularity could all affect prospective memory (Vortac, Edwards & Manning, 1995).
In the context of ATC, prospective memory failures can prove to be catastrophic. The incident at San Francisco of a controller positioning an aircraft on the runway for takeoff, forgetting about it, and further clearing an aircraft to land on the same runway is a case in point (Loft, 2014). They can affect controller actions such as separation, scope monitoring or performing other tasks such as flight strip updates, aircraft transfer, peer collaboration and shift transitions. Inaccurate recall of information on a strip, failing to observe conflicts and failure to annotate strips correctly are all examples of PM failures. Controllers may intend correctly but then fail to follow through on that thinking because they simply “forgot to do so”. In the realm of ATC, cues are either based on time or based on events (Loft, 2014; McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). However, monitoring takes a cost in the form of “brain cycles” and therefore impacts performance. Such impacts could come in the form of slowing down a certain action in order to devote time to monitoring.
External cues are an effective way to mitigate the risks of prospective memory failure (Vortac & Edwards, 1995). Memory aids are useful and can be any tool, prop or other aid that could serve as a reminder (FAA Video, 2015). They need to be incorporated into the routine though and not be ad-hoc. Mnemonics and placards are one way to avoid prospective memory errors (Loft, 2014; Stein, 1991). Using free text to jot down notes is another option. Memory aids must be effective. A good example from the video is that of holding a strip in hand as a reminder when there is a vehicle inspecting the runway. There is a growing interest in having the system alert and warn if an action is overdue. The sophistication available today makes it possible to code rules into the system and have it warn the controller. However, this may lead to the same type of over dependence on automation and sense of complacency that we find occur in pilots.
References
Federal Aviation Administration. (2015, September 02). Retrieved April 25, 2017, from https://www.faa.gov/tv/?mediaId=1151 (Links to an external site.)
Federal Aviation Administration. (2015, September 02). Retrieved April 25, 2017, from https://www.faa.gov/tv/?mediaId=1152 (Links to an external site.)
Loft, S. (2014). Applying psychological science to examine prospective memory in simulated air traffic control. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 23(5), 326-331.
McDaniel, M. A.. & Einstein G. (2007). Prospective Memory. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/erau/detail.action?docID=996509
Shorrock, S. T. (2005). Errors of memory in air traffic control. Safety science, 43(8), 571-588.
Stein, E. S., & Federal Aviation Administration Technical Center (U.S.). (1991). Air traffic controller memory: A field survey. (). Springfield, Va;Atlantic City International Airport, N.J;: Federal Aviation Administration Technical Center.
Sternberg, R. J., & Sternberg, K. (2016). Cognitive psychology. Nelson Education.
Vortac, O. U., Edwards, M. B., & Manning, C. A. (1995). Functions of external cues in prospective memory. Memory, 3(2), 201-219.
Aviation Moment
A picture from Feb 2003, Singapore.
Aviation Moment
Simulator Benefits
There is little doubt that simulators have redefined the realm of initial and recurrent training in both Military and Commercial aviation. Cost benefits have been a primary consideration. Lowering the risk of training has been the other major benefit. Achieving balance between simulator and real-aircraft training time has been a subject of much debate and research. Leaning too much to either format has impact. On one side, cost impacts could be significant. On the other, the trainee has little feel for what it is like to be performing this tasks in a real aircraft.
There is also truth to the fact that some areas of training are better handled in a sim while others absolutely need an aircraft. In my opinion, simulators have evolved to a point where they are close to ‘as real as it gets’. Transfer of training has proven to be effective. Aircrafts have become more technically advanced and a lot of training is focused on procedure and automation – an area where sims lend themselves to really well.
Replication of real-world weather, comms, terrain, flight dynamics have become possible. There isn’t a lot of loss in ambient factors in a simulator today.
In fact the term ‘supplement’ almost implies that sims are secondary. That has changed with time. In many areas, simulators end up being primary channels for training while aircraft-based training come in at an equal percentage or less.
Again, the one major risk of doing too much time in a sim is that it may lead to a situation where the trainee has little or no feel for what the real world circumstances will be like. This too, then comes down to how well real world factors are modeled into a simulation ecosystem – aka fidelity.
Aviation Moment
The Cost Index – what is it?
There was a time, not too long ago, when oil prices had peaked and jet fuel was a very expensive commodity. In times when jet fuel is as expensive as it is, fuel conservation is a mission critical exercise.
Aircraft design over the years has evolved to provide help in this direction. The Flight Management Computer (FMC) also called as the FMS was itself a revolutionary innovation. One of the features of the FMC is the Cost Index.
The cost index (CI) feature of the FMC can help air carriers reduce operating costs. significantly reduce operating costs.
While coming up with the Cost Index itself can be a complicated task, once that number is available and used in the FMC, the FMC uses it to compute aircraft performance primarily to maximize speed, minimize fuel burn.
Bill Roberson, Senior Safety Pilot, Flight Operations @ Boeing, wrote a really detailed article in the AERO newsletter back in 2007.
The concept is so valuable that it has become routine in aviation operations.
References:
Roberson, B. (2007). Fuel Conservation Strategies: cost index explained. Boeing Aero Quarterly, 2(2007), 26-28.
WU, J. D., WEI, Z. Q., & NIE, R. T. (2007). Calculating and Analyzing Cost Index Based on Long Range Cruise [J]. Journal of Civil Aviation University of China, 3.
Cook, A., Tanner, G., Williams, V., & Meise, G. (2009). Dynamic cost indexing–Managing airline delay costs. Journal of air transport management, 15(1), 26-35.
Aviation Human Factors: Communication to Action
Words spoken or written, absolutely have a deep impact on an audience. The “It’s a Beautiful Day, and I Can’t See It” video is a testament to this reality of life. Language is a powerful tool, and even unspoken words can elicit an emotional response from others.
All action follows perception. In the video, the same message rewritten a different way had a totally different response. The fact that different words caused different response indicates that beyond triggering action, the human brain develops some form of visualization when presented with words. Such visualization triggers emotions. Emotions supplement the action. While the basic action of giving to the blind man remained the same, the quantum of giving was driven by the emotion that was generated by the newly stated signboard.
The first step in human information processing is perception. The process of receipt allows the brain to perform other actions thereafter. So if the perception is formed wrong, all other actions thereafter will also be wrong. In the context of ATC human factors, this is critical to understand. It is for this reason that pilots and controllers speak standard phraseology. Certain terms are exclusively maintained within such standard phraseology to drive certain perceptions followed thereafter by a specific set of actions. For example, an ‘emergency’ call is meant to drive certain actions.
Despite this, mis-perception (and hence incorrect, inaccurate follow through) can be caused due to many reasons. One such reason can be premeditated expectations on the part of the recipient. There are times when a listener is expecting a certain input and regardless of what the speaker says, the listener tends to “hear what she/he expected to hear”. For example, in a recent Flying magazine article, a pilot continued his approach despite the controller asking him to go-around. This is partly because the pilot had a deep set intention to complete his approach and land. In another such article, the pilot made a left 360 despite the controller asking him explicitly to make a right turn. Comfort with a left turn or a premeditated thought, or prior experience at that airport caused him to make a left turn this time. Other factors may play a role. For example, a pilot gets a clearance. It contains an intersection that’s not on the SID. A sense of intimidation can cause a pilot not to ask for clarification. This can lead to issues once in flight. In the case of Avianca 52, the simple use of the ‘emergency’ word may have saved the situation. That term sets a perception. The term “caution” in ATC is meant to drive additional care on the part of the pilot.
So as can be seen the use of (or the lack of use of) certain phrases is very important in the ATC context. On the other hand, the use of non-standard language can be equally damaging. Using non-standard terms dilutes the purpose for which they are meant for. Crisp, succinct use of language is very important in certain operational contexts. Often in un-towered airports, pilots use the CTAF frequency for general talk. One in a while that may be okay but such use dilutes the use of that frequency for more important safety calls.
Communication, perception and action are tightly connected. Words affect perception and perception affects action.
CJ
