Tag: flight training

Cognitive Psychology in Aviation

~ cjois

Failures in prospective memory (PM) are the reason why we fail to perform intended or required actions. There is increasing interest in the topic of prospective memory and the reasons for failures of such memory. While this subject is still under intense debate, according to one school of thought, prospective memory recall is driven by the process of monitoring. Another view is that it occurs as part of spontaneous retrieval.

In either case, the intention for the planned task is retrieved which then allows for action. Distractions are one source of why action is forgotten. Interruptions of any kind can be a cause (Shorrock, 2005; Sternberg & Sternberg, 2016). A telephone call or request for information can be sufficient cause to not return back to the ongoing task. The variety of peripheral tasks that controllers need to perform often conflict with the primary task of maintaining separation. Such tasks could include scanning displays, accepting aircraft, gathering and relaying weather advisories and responding to pilot requests.

Prospective memory recall is predicated on cues. A cue or trigger is necessary for prospective memory to work. As described earlier, to recall the intent, the human mind constantly polls for such items. When polling is not invested in, such as when we are preoccupied with other task(s), then the intent is not recalled and action is termed as ‘forgotten’. Under another school of thought, spontaneous retrieval occurs on account of a system within our brain that causes automatic retrieval of items at the appropriate times. Once again, when tasks preoccupy, spontaneity drops and we tend to forget the intent. Proximity, recency and task regularity could all affect prospective memory (Vortac, Edwards & Manning, 1995).In the context of ATC, prospective memory failures can prove to be catastrophic.

The incident at San Francisco of a controller positioning an aircraft on the runway for takeoff, forgetting about it, and further clearing an aircraft to land on the same runway is a case in point (Loft, 2014). They can affect controller actions such as separation, scope monitoring or performing other tasks such as flight strip updates, aircraft transfer, peer collaboration and shift transitions. Inaccurate recall of information on a strip, failing to observe conflicts and failure to annotate strips correctly are all examples of PM failures. Controllers may intend correctly but then fail to follow through on that thinking because they simply “forgot to do so”. In the realm of ATC, cues are either based on time or based on events (Loft, 2014; McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). However, monitoring takes a cost in the form of “brain cycles” and therefore impacts performance. Such impacts could come in the form of slowing down a certain action in order to devote time to monitoring.External cues are an effective way to mitigate the risks of prospective memory failure (Vortac & Edwards, 1995).

Memory aids are useful and can be any tool, prop or other aid that could serve as a reminder (FAA Video, 2015). They need to be incorporated into the routine though and not be ad-hoc. Mnemonics and placards are one way to avoid prospective memory errors (Loft, 2014; Stein, 1991). Using free text to jot down notes is another option. Memory aids must be effective. A good example from the video is that of holding a strip in hand as a reminder when there is a vehicle inspecting the runway.

There is a growing interest in having the system alert and warn if an action is overdue. The sophistication available today makes it possible to code rules into the system and have it warn the controller. However, this may lead to the same type of over dependence on automation and sense of complacency that we find occur in pilots. 

References

Federal Aviation Administration. (2015, September 02). Retrieved April 25, 2017, from https://www.faa.gov/tv/?mediaId=1151

Federal Aviation Administration. (2015, September 02). Retrieved April 25, 2017, from https://www.faa.gov/tv/?mediaId=1152

Loft, S. (2014). Applying psychological science to examine prospective memory in simulated air traffic control. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 23(5), 326-331.

McDaniel, M. A.. & Einstein G. (2007). Prospective Memory. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/erau/detail.action?docID=996509

Shorrock, S. T. (2005). Errors of memory in air traffic control. Safety science, 43(8), 571-588.

Stein, E. S., & Federal Aviation Administration Technical Center (U.S.). (1991).

Air traffic controller memory: A field survey. (). Springfield, Va;Atlantic City International Airport, N.J;: Federal Aviation Administration Technical Center.

Sternberg, R. J., & Sternberg, K. (2016). Cognitive psychology. Nelson Education.

Vortac, O. U., Edwards, M. B., & Manning, C. A. (1995). Functions of external cues in prospective memory. Memory, 3(2), 201-219.

Fatigue on the FlightDeck

~ cjois

Generally speaking, ‘Fatigue’ is predominantly influenced by sleep loss and circadian rhythm disruptions (Salas & Maurino, 2007). Fatigue is not a problem that is specific to one area of Aviation. All forms of aviation are at risk. While much of the research focuses on long-haul aviation, a lone GA pilot battling cognitive overload can quickly turn into a fatigue-crisis (Guastello et al., 2012). In addition, few General Aviation pilots have adequate training or resources to detect onset, and/or remedy, Fatigue (Harris et al., 1995) 

GA would benefit from a simple model that can consume simple parameters such as flying conditions, route of travel,  pilot health, sleep history, pilot flying history etc. and provide a risk score to a pilot based on which a decision to fly can be made.

 I believe that even knowing that there is a level of risk given all the parameters that exist is a great thing to have. The IMSAFE checklist is good, however, when one goes through the checklist  it is indeed hard to have a true assessment. I have seen many times that GA pilots run through teh checklist quickly and decide to fly. However, I have often thought whether a GA Pilot would reject a decision to fly based on knowing that the pilot has had a growing sleep deficit over the past week or month; or whether a forecast indicated sharp temperature drop between altitudes (indicating turbulent air in that region) combined with a sleep deficit should deter a pilot from flying that day. 

Fatigue can occur pretty rapidly even in a fully fit individual in a GA cockpit (with little automation). When combined with other factors, the situation can unravel very quickly (Salas & Maurino, 2010). I know from experience that there have been days when I have gone out for a recreation flight in the local area and after battling turbulent air in single piston aircraft for 90 minutes, I have landed and felt really worn out from the experience – add a situation of 4-5 hours of sleep the prior night and this fatigue multiplies multi-fold.

They highlight the mission-critical dependence on human performance in some industries or professions. I don’t believe that this dependence, or impact,  is even comprehended by most outside these professions. I have felt that even working for an airline experiencing the pressures involved in keeping a real-time operation running optimally does not fully clarify the complexity. The body of literature on this topic is immense and just reading a few of the papers (infinitesimal, compared to the literature available) on the subject of shift scheduling in some industries has evolved my thinking on the topic. The references below indicate some of the papers that I found very helpful in getting to understand some basic facets of this subject. The integration of fatigue models into scheduling algorithms was a very interesting topic (Ta-Chung & Cheng-Che, 2014). One conclusion I draw… scheduling in some industries is not merely about managing time and people. It is multi-dimensional and mission-critical. 

References

Barton, J., & Folkard, S. (1993). Advancing versus delaying shift systems. Ergonomics, 36(1-3), 59-64. doi:10.1080/00140139308967855

Caldwell, J. A., Mallis, M. M., Caldwell, J. L., Paul, M. A., Miller, J. C., Neri, D. F., & Aerospace Medical Association Fatigue Countermeasures Subcommittee of the Aerospace Human Factors Committee. (2009). Fatigue countermeasures in aviation. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 80(1), 29-59. doi:10.3357/ASEM.2435.2009

Guastello, S., Boeh, H., Schimmels, M., & Shumaker, C. (2012;2011;). Catastrophe models for cognitive workload and fatigue. Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science, 13(5), 586-17. doi:10.1080/1463922X.2011.552131

Harris, W. C., Hancock, P. A., Arthur, E. J., & Caird, J. K. (1995). Performance, workload, and fatigue changes associated with automation. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 5(2), 169-185. doi:10.1207/s15327108ijap0502_3

Knauth, P. (1996). Designing better shift systems. Applied Ergonomics, 27(1), 39-44. doi:10.1016/0003-6870(95)00044-5

Salas, E., & Maurino, D. E. (2010). Human factors in aviation (2nd ed.). Boston, Mass;Amsterdam;: Academic Press/Elsevier.

Smith, L., Hammond, T., Macdonald, I., & Folkard, S. (1998). 12-h shifts are popular but are they a solution?International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics, 21(3), 323-331. doi:10.1016/S0169-8141(97)00046-2

Ta-Chung, W., & Cheng-Che, L. (2014). Optimal work shift scheduling with fatigue minimization and day off.Mathematical Problems in Engineering, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/75156

Task Management on the FlightDeck

~ cjois

One of the highlights of this week’s readings was the aspect of coherence (Salas & Maurino, 2010). For coherence to be effective, pilots need to have a deep understanding of the underlying logic, systems and automation impacts. The cognitive load has grown significantly over the years and continues to grow even faster today. While it is possible to acquire and display a lot more data in the form of meaningful information on extra-rich customizable displays, an important consideration would be to understand at what point this reaches practical human limits.

In the end, there is no limit on information that can be provided or assimilated by the crew. What matters is how much can be meaningfully assimilated in limited amounts of time (many times minutes or seconds) and most importantly, acted upon to achieve an outcome.

Information overload occurs frequently and very rapidly. My observation is that a few different visual and aural call-outs occurring simultaneously (example: a GPWS callout and a TCAS alert) are enough to cause overload in an otherwise quiet flightdeck. If they occur to be in conflict its worse.

With rising stress levels, saturation occurs faster (Salas & Maurino, 2010).  The ability to filter, and hone in, on important elements of information being presented is the answer to avoiding overwhelm. I believe that this ability is a function of two things – a) experience and b) personality.

CJ

References

Salas, E. & Maurino, D. (2010). Human Factors in Aviation (2nd Ed.). New York: Academic Press.

Supplementing flight time with simulation time

~ cjois

There is little doubt that simulators have redefined the realm of initial and recurrent training in both Military and Commercial aviation. Cost benefits have been a primary consideration. Lowering the risk of training has been the other major benefit. Achieving balance between simulator and real-aircraft training time has been a subject of much debate and research. Leaning too much to either format has impact. On one side, cost impacts could be significant. On the other, the trainee has little feel for what it is like to be performing this tasks in a real aircraft.
There is also truth to the fact that some areas of training are better handled in a sim while others absolutely need an aircraft.
In my opinion, simulators have evolved to a point where they are close to ‘as real as it gets’. Transfer of training has proven to be effective. Aircrafts have become more technically advanced and a lot of training is focused on procedure and automation – an area where sims lend themselves to really well.
Replication of real-world weather, comms, terrain, flight dynamics have become possible. There isn’t a lot of loss in ambient factors in a simulator today.
In fact the term ‘supplement’ almost implies that sims are secondary. That has changed with time. In many areas, simulators end up being primary channels for training while aircraft-based training come in at an equal percentage or less.
Again, the one major risk of doing too much time in a sim is that it may lead to a situation where the trainee has little or no feel for what the real world circumstances will be like. This too, then comes down to how well real world factors are modeled into a simulation ecosystem – aka fidelity.