Category: flying

Failure scenarios with a Simulator

~ cjois

Far too many times, I find that a flight simulator, even expensive FAA-certified ones are used to practice routine flying… sometimes even just as a game. That is such a poor use of a fabulous tool.

One of the more important use cases for a simulator is the ability to generate failures. This past week, I used the combination of my simulator and my PilotEdge membership to practice a failure – a GPS failure. As much as we have come to take these technologies for granted, there are days when things fail. I didn’t intend to actually fly such a failure on the simulator last week. it so happened that I filed with a flight plan with the wrong aircraft suffix /I – which stood for “No GNSS” capability (aka no GPS). When the Clearance Delivery controller confirmed with me as to whether I had no GPS equipment, I realized that I had used the wrong code. I could easily correct the code and re-file. However, I used the opportunity to note down that scenario as yet another one that all GA pilots must practice regularly. Indeed on a particular day, we may have an NAVAID outage or an equipment failure – and the need to fly without GPS that day will become real.

It was momentarily disorienting to be asked that question. Imagine actually getting ready for a flight and discovering that the Garmin 530W doesn’t turn on, or worse still, malfunctions in flight. This is exactly where practice comes in handy. Being prepared for a situation or having experienced it before makes it a lot easier to react to it when it occurs. This is exactly the use of advanced technology in flight training – getting the flying brain tuned to circumstances that are out of the ordinary.

There is a ton of technology in use in the aviation ecosystem, however, that does not mean that all elements of it will work correctly always. It is important to be prepared for the time when one of them does not.

General Aviation pilots, especially those that do not fly for a living, or are just weekend pilots must absolutely practice these scenarios.

CP Jois

AQP & Crew Resource Management

~ cjois

CRM began with presentation at NASA in 1979 (Bruce, Gao, & King, 2018). Born against the backdrop of the Tenerife disaster in 1977 and the United Airlines incident over Portland, Oregon in 1978, CRM has evolved and what we see today is known as 6th generation CRM (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999). Major changes have occurred between the Cockpit Resource Management of 1979 and the Crew Resource Management models of today. The primary shifts have been around scope and inclusiveness. The Colgan Air mishap in 2014 then led to a shift from passive CRM to a far more active Threat and Error model-based CRM (Holt & Poynor, 2016).

While very complex when studied in detail, stated simply, ‘Threats’ and ‘Errors’ necessitate CRM-based actions/behaviors. Fatigue is a ‘Threat’, can cause ‘Errors’, and needs CRM-based behavior to remediate or recover from the situation. Given this simplistic formulation of the model, it is pertinent that we model the various types of threats that fatigue can pose before we can bake it into the CRM/TEM training programs. Fatigue has known to cause many incidents. American 1420 in June 1999, Colgan Air 3407 in February 2009, Corporate Airlines 5966 in October 2004 are all cases where fatigue has been called out as a leading factor (Avers & Johnson, 2011) 

Unlike skill or competency training, where measurement is somewhat easier, training for behavioral responses is not all that straightforward. For example, training for a response to deal with an engine flame out on takeoff is not the same as training someone for executing a flight control maneuver. Training on factors like fatigue is more complex. On one hand, the human mechanism will not produce behaviors of an individual in a fatigued state unless they are in a state of fatigue. On the other hand, it will be a logistical challenge to get pilot resources to be a part of a simulator scenarios when they are in actually in state of fatigue. 

However, a value-additive approach to building training around fatigue-related behaviors is to first demonstrate the outcomes that fatigue can produce through simulations and scenarios. Since it is a such a strong reality of aviation today, it is worth modeling, scheduling and planning for simulator training for individuals when they are really in a state of fatigue. As an example, scheduling an intense simulator session when the circadian rhythm is in a trough is a good start. This could be further intensified by scheduling a full day of work prior to the late evening simulator session. These could induce fatigue prior to being presented with scenarios.

Fatigue like many things can only be measured through the many symptoms of fatigue it produces. The Center for Human Sciences in Farnborough, UK has developed a model for fatigue describing the symptoms of fatigue (Belyavin & Spencer, 2004). Some of them are as follows – diminished perception, a general lack of awareness; diminished motor skills and sluggish reactions; problems with short-term memory; channeled concentration, fixation on a single possibly unimportant issue, to the neglect of others; being easily distracted by unimportant matters; poor judgement; and slow decision making.

Modeling simulator scenarios that are focused on amplifying the symptoms above will yield the best results from a training perspective. Let us choose the symptom of fatigue-induced short-term memory. Modeling a high traffic congested airspace with multiple air traffic control inputs such as altitude/heading/speed changes, approach restrictions and last-minute runway changes could provide for a scenario where effects of fatigue on short term memory can be assessed.

It is important to note that not everyone reacts the same way to fatigue. While the list of symptoms is generic, each human is different. The “Swiss Cheese (Reason) model” begins to come together when a human weakness aligns with a fatigue-induced symptom and the prevailing circumstance to cause an incident (Reason, Hollnagel, & Paries, 2006). To elaborate further, if a pilot monitoring (PM) and managing communications on the flightdeck is weaker on short-term memory capacity to begin with (when compared to say, her/his motor skills), then fatigue will impact her/his ability to read back and comply with air traffic control inputs. The fatigue threat, causes memory errors, leading to the need for CRM-based recovery. Recovery in this situation could be the pilot flying (PF) noticing it and taking remedial actions. On the other hand, if one has the propensity to be weaker at motor reflexes, then fatigue would impact their ability manually control the airplane. Other scenarios could include failure annunciations to appear late in the approach requiring a quick go-around decision. Fatigue impairs decision making and such scenarios could make for good insights.  

The challenge most times is that many/most individuals aren’t aware of their weak areas and believe that they can “pull it off”. 

The value in AQP, CRM/TEM models is that they allow for the program to be setup in a way that it exposes resources to reality of these situations and more importantly allows individuals, to some degree, understand their own limitations. No amount of Powerpoint presentations will provide the experience of being in the situation, even if it is only in a simulator.

References:

Avers, K., & Johnson, W. B. (2011). A review of Federal Aviation Administration fatigue research: Transitioning scientific results to the aviation industry. Aviation Psychology and Applied Human Factors, 1(2), 87–98. https://doi-org.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/10.1027/2192-0923/a000016

Belyavin, A. J., & Spencer, M. B. (2004). Modeling performance and alertness: the QinetiQ approach. Aviation, space, and environmental medicine, 75(3), A93-A103.

Bruce, P. J., Gao, Y., & King, J. M. C. (2018;2017;). Airline operations: A practical guide (1st ed.). London, [England];New York, New York;: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315566450

Helmreich, R. L., Merritt, A. C., & Wilhelm, J. A. (1999). The evolution of crew resource management training in commercial aviation. The international journal of aviation psychology, 9(1), 19-32.

Holt, M. J., & Poynor, P. J. (2016). Air carrier operations (Second ed.). Newcastle, Washington: Aviation Supplies & Academics, Inc.

Reason, J., Hollnagel, E., & Paries, J. (2006). Revisiting the Swiss cheese model of accidents. Journal of Clinical Engineering, 27(4), 110-115.

Microsoft Flight Simulator 2020

~ cjois

For flight enthusiasts, even 40 years of using flight simulator products cannot dampen the enthusiasm and excitement of hearing that a new version of a flight simulator or a new product is being launched. The childlike excitement that builds up upon hearing of a new flight sim product is beyond words. So was the case with me as well…. although I admit that experience does bring in a little more patience. For once, I did not download MSFS2020 on August 18, the day it was launched. I waited a little for the software to settle down. Although with each passing day, my patience would ebb, and finally in the middle of September I couldn’t wait any longer and hit download!.

The installation went off with little effort, no hung machine, no crashes, etc. Although it was long download 90+ GB. I had to find a long ethernet cable to wire the PC to the router. Otherwise, despite the fast internet service I have, this download would take forever. The machine had been upgraded to Win 10, a good I7 4.2Ghz 64GB, 4GB GPU NVIDIA card, enough to run the new simulator.

Then came the time to start the simulator. I clicked on it, and the wait was long. My initial thought was that it was because the first run of any software does take a little longer. With some intro music in a loop, the -re-load was painfully long, then came the selection screen. I first set the simulator down to the barest, simplest settings. Rendering on LOW, Traffic OFF, base resolution.

The Ux is pretty intuitive. Setting up controls was not straightforward. Especially setting up the CH Yoke, a long-standing standard in simulation, was not simple. Having that out of the way, I started my first flight using a C172S. CTD!

Had to restart the simulator, another 10-15 mins gone. Flight config done, aircraft at the runway, CTD.

Reduced settings even further hopping to eliminate CTD issues, restarted the simulator. Took off from my favorite airport EDDF (Frankfurt Main). Rendering was not smooth. Tuned aliasing. Got better. However, the aircraft felt jittery and a little too much in-air movement. Being a real-world pilot who flies the Cessna 172S regularly I can say confidently that the real aircraft doesn’t feel anything like that unless there is severe turbulence. I tried to turn on auto-pilot to see if the physical controls were causing noise and hence the jitter. That did not fix the issue. Clearly, it was not something that The user or controls were causing. The jitter appeared to be in the simulator or the flight model. I made one turn on to the downwind leg. CTD.

Restarted the simulator and got the aircraft positioned. This time managed to complete one flight around the pattern.

On another flight, I used the Boeing 747-8. The aircraft booted up correctly. However, the joy was shortlived. A few minutes after takeoff, on climb-out the simulator stopped working.

The real-time traffic feature is a splendid one – however, I don’t believe it functions correctly. It is designed to use FlightAware traffic data however, at no point is the simulator reproducing any of the real-time FlightAware traffic correctly.

The color textures are very nicely done. haven’t really experienced all of the variety yet. BING Maps integration does bring an element of reality to the terrain around. It fills the void in prior simulators.

Overall, I spent 3-4 evenings using it, and then finally last weekend, I stopped wasting my time with it. I am serious about using my simulator for safety and proficiency gain. Like everyone, time is limited and I would rather use a simulation that works and gives me max benefit for the 45 mins to 90 minutes that I use it. Spending 10-12-15 mins to load up a simulator, and then not have it stay on is not a good use of time. MS or Asobo Studios needs to look at this product again. Tune it for efficiency – and ensure that it stays up. Knowing that it is software, yes, it will have some errors and will CTD at times. But that can’t be the norm.

Will wait for it to stabilize before I try it again. In the meantime, I am back to X-Plane and P3D…
CJ

Simulators during the lock-down

~ cjois

I write frequently about the value of flight simulators. There couldn’t be a more important time than we are in now to realize the value of a simulator.

It has something for anyone connected to aviation. For students, a simulator provides a great platform to stay proficient. For pilots, it provides the basis to avoid rust and at the same time enjoy flying while not being able to access the real aircraft and fly anywhere. For instrument rated pilots or students, it provides the opportunity to practice approaches of various types. The benefits of simulation have been long discussed here in my blog and everywhere else.

I would urge anyone with access to a simulator to use them extensively. Whether you an log the time in your logbook or not is not material. Whether you can seek credit for the time or not is not material either. Whats important is that you can use the simulator. The transfer of training benefits from a simulator are significant. If you are able to use a networked simulator with a service like PilotEdge, these benefits are further enhanced.

CJ

Air Traffic Management – what the does future hold?

~ cjois

It is clear that air traffic management (ATM) across the globe is changing and changing rapidly. For the past several decades ATM has remained fairly constant and while changes have occurred they have been evolutionary. However, changes that are on the anvil are revolutionary and transformational.
Regardless of whether its NextGen in the US, or SESAR in Europe or CARATS in Japan, air traffic management is about to change permanently. Each of these programs has multiple tracks and while each of these programs gives these tracks different labels, there are many similarities in their goals. Efficient flight routing, fuels savings, noise abatement, balancing separation and safety, minimizing weather impact, shifting the dependence on voice communications are examples of the goals of these initiatives.
Its evident that with such a vast slew of changes, there will be impacts from a human factors perspective. A wide variety of tests are in progress to determine the totality of these impacts. The role of the human within the operation will change. Whether its providing clearances or issuing instructions through voice communications, the role of the individual is up for change. Air traffic is increasing rapidly. Passenger volumes are on the rise. ATM is in dire need of change. The dependence on the individual is here to stay for a long time, however, the system can be designed to help rather than burden the individual. One observation that can be drawn from the videos is that ATM may be at risk of experiencing the same type of issues that aircrafts went through when large scale transformations were introduced. One of those examples is flight deck automation. While the autopilot and FMS were valuable additions to the flight deck, they brought along with them several new risks. Some of those risks continue to materialize several years after those innovations were introduced.
It is not difficult to envision these types of risks when ADS-B, ERAM, Digital Voice, Performance-based Navigation or any of the other tracks in NextGen bring major changes to ATM. All of these change programs will bring relief to roles within ATM while also bringing on new challenges.
References:
Federal Aviation Administration. (2016, May 3). FAA TV: NextGen: See, Navigate & Communicate. Retrieved from www.faa.gov: https://www.faa.gov/tv/?mediaId=1332
JAXA | 宇宙航空研究開発機構]. (2014, March 6). Next generation air-traffic management system “DREAMS”. Retrieved from
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8WvVfDqVKes (Links to an external site.)
[SESAR]. (2014, February 12). SESAR Solutions explained. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7shT5W_rI1Q

Aviation Human Factors and Prospective Memory

~ cjois

Prospective memory is an emerging area of research within the field of Cognitive Psychology and Human Factors. Remembering to perform intended actions can be critical, especially in safety-related occupations like Air Traffic Control.

Failures in prospective memory (PM) are the reason why we fail to perform intended or required actions. There is increasing interest in the topic of prospective memory and the reasons for failures of such memory. While this subject is still under intense debate, according to one school of thought, prospective memory recall is driven by the process of monitoring. Another view is that it occurs as part of spontaneous retrieval. In either case, the intention for the planned task is retrieved which then allows for action. Distractions are one source of why action is forgotten.

Interruptions of any kind can be a cause (Shorrock, 2005; Sternberg & Sternberg, 2016). A telephone call or request for information can be sufficient cause to not return back to the ongoing task. The variety of peripheral tasks that controllers need to perform often conflict with the primary task of maintaining separation. Such tasks could include scanning displays, accepting aircraft, gathering and relaying weather advisories and responding to pilot requests.

Prospective memory recall is predicated on cues. A cue or trigger is necessary for prospective memory to work. As described earlier, to recall the intent, the human mind constantly polls for such items. When polling is not invested in, such as when we are preoccupied with other task(s), then the intent is not recalled and action is termed as ‘forgotten’. Under another school of thought, spontaneous retrieval occurs on account of a system within our brain that causes automatic retrieval of items at the appropriate times. Once again, when tasks preoccupy, spontaneity drops and we tend to forget the intent. Proximity, recency and task regularity could all affect prospective memory (Vortac, Edwards & Manning, 1995).

In the context of ATC, prospective memory failures can prove to be catastrophic. The incident at San Francisco of a controller positioning an aircraft on the runway for takeoff, forgetting about it, and further clearing an aircraft to land on the same runway is a case in point (Loft, 2014). They can affect controller actions such as separation, scope monitoring or performing other tasks such as flight strip updates, aircraft transfer, peer collaboration and shift transitions. Inaccurate recall of information on a strip, failing to observe conflicts and failure to annotate strips correctly are all examples of PM failures. Controllers may intend correctly but then fail to follow through on that thinking because they simply “forgot to do so”. In the realm of ATC, cues are either based on time or based on events (Loft, 2014; McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). However, monitoring takes a cost in the form of “brain cycles” and therefore impacts performance. Such impacts could come in the form of slowing down a certain action in order to devote time to monitoring.

External cues are an effective way to mitigate the risks of prospective memory failure (Vortac & Edwards, 1995). Memory aids are useful and can be any tool, prop or other aid that could serve as a reminder (FAA Video, 2015). They need to be incorporated into the routine though and not be ad-hoc. Mnemonics and placards are one way to avoid prospective memory errors (Loft, 2014; Stein, 1991). Using free text to jot down notes is another option. Memory aids must be effective. A good example from the video is that of holding a strip in hand as a reminder when there is a vehicle inspecting the runway. There is a growing interest in having the system alert and warn if an action is overdue. The sophistication available today makes it possible to code rules into the system and have it warn the controller. However, this may lead to the same type of over dependence on automation and sense of complacency that we find occur in pilots.

References
Federal Aviation Administration. (2015, September 02). Retrieved April 25, 2017, from https://www.faa.gov/tv/?mediaId=1151 (Links to an external site.)
Federal Aviation Administration. (2015, September 02). Retrieved April 25, 2017, from https://www.faa.gov/tv/?mediaId=1152 (Links to an external site.)
Loft, S. (2014). Applying psychological science to examine prospective memory in simulated air traffic control. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 23(5), 326-331.
McDaniel, M. A.. & Einstein G. (2007). Prospective Memory. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/erau/detail.action?docID=996509
Shorrock, S. T. (2005). Errors of memory in air traffic control. Safety science, 43(8), 571-588.
Stein, E. S., & Federal Aviation Administration Technical Center (U.S.). (1991). Air traffic controller memory: A field survey. (). Springfield, Va;Atlantic City International Airport, N.J;: Federal Aviation Administration Technical Center.
Sternberg, R. J., & Sternberg, K. (2016). Cognitive psychology. Nelson Education.
Vortac, O. U., Edwards, M. B., & Manning, C. A. (1995). Functions of external cues in prospective memory. Memory, 3(2), 201-219.

The Cost Index – what is it?

~ cjois

There was a time, not too long ago, when oil prices had peaked and jet fuel was a very expensive commodity. In times when jet fuel is as expensive as it is, fuel conservation is a mission critical exercise.

Aircraft design over the years has evolved to provide help in this direction. The Flight Management Computer (FMC) also called as the FMS was itself a revolutionary innovation. One of the features of the FMC is the Cost Index.

The cost index (CI) feature of the FMC can help air carriers reduce operating costs. significantly reduce operating costs.

While coming up with the Cost Index itself can be a complicated task, once that number is available and used in the FMC, the FMC uses it to compute aircraft performance primarily to maximize speed, minimize fuel burn.

Bill Roberson, Senior Safety Pilot, Flight Operations @ Boeing, wrote a really detailed article in the AERO newsletter back in 2007.

The concept is so valuable that it has become routine in aviation operations.

References:
Roberson, B. (2007). Fuel Conservation Strategies: cost index explained. Boeing Aero Quarterly, 2(2007), 26-28.
WU, J. D., WEI, Z. Q., & NIE, R. T. (2007). Calculating and Analyzing Cost Index Based on Long Range Cruise [J]. Journal of Civil Aviation University of China, 3.
Cook, A., Tanner, G., Williams, V., & Meise, G. (2009). Dynamic cost indexing–Managing airline delay costs. Journal of air transport management, 15(1), 26-35.

Aviation Human Factors: Communication to Action

~ cjois

Words spoken or written, absolutely have a deep impact on an audience. The “It’s a Beautiful Day, and I Can’t See It” video is a testament to this reality of life. Language is a powerful tool, and even unspoken words can elicit an emotional response from others.

All action follows perception. In the video, the same message rewritten a different way had a totally different response. The fact that different words caused different response indicates that beyond triggering action, the human brain develops some form of visualization when presented with words. Such visualization triggers emotions. Emotions supplement the action. While the basic action of giving to the blind man remained the same, the quantum of giving was driven by the emotion that was generated by the newly stated signboard.

The first step in human information processing is perception. The process of receipt allows the brain to perform other actions thereafter. So if the perception is formed wrong, all other actions thereafter will also be wrong. In the context of ATC human factors, this is critical to understand. It is for this reason that pilots and controllers speak standard phraseology. Certain terms are exclusively maintained within such standard phraseology to drive certain perceptions followed thereafter by a specific set of actions. For example, an ‘emergency’ call is meant to drive certain actions.

Despite this, mis-perception (and hence incorrect, inaccurate follow through) can be caused due to many reasons. One such reason can be premeditated expectations on the part of the recipient. There are times when a listener is expecting a certain input and regardless of what the speaker says, the listener tends to “hear what she/he expected to hear”. For example, in a recent Flying magazine article, a pilot continued his approach despite the controller asking him to go-around. This is partly because the pilot had a deep set intention to complete his approach and land. In another such article, the pilot made a left 360 despite the controller asking him explicitly to make a right turn. Comfort with a left turn or a premeditated thought, or prior experience at that airport caused him to make a left turn this time. Other factors may play a role. For example, a pilot gets a clearance. It contains an intersection that’s not on the SID. A sense of intimidation can cause a pilot not to ask for clarification. This can lead to issues once in flight. In the case of Avianca 52, the simple use of the ‘emergency’ word may have saved the situation. That term sets a perception. The term “caution” in ATC is meant to drive additional care on the part of the pilot.

So as can be seen the use of (or the lack of use of) certain phrases is very important in the ATC context. On the other hand, the use of non-standard language can be equally damaging. Using non-standard terms dilutes the purpose for which they are meant for. Crisp, succinct use of language is very important in certain operational contexts. Often in un-towered airports, pilots use the CTAF frequency for general talk. One in a while that may be okay but such use dilutes the use of that frequency for more important safety calls.

Communication, perception and action are tightly connected. Words affect perception and perception affects action.

CJ