Simulators and the Logbook

In the context of flight training the discussion of simulator time that can be logged versus not logged is an important one. There is a general argument that if the FARs do not allow the time to be logged then why spend more time in a simulator. Firstly, it is important to understand that there is a difference between “logging” and “being able to apply” those hours for credit towards the PPL. The FAA does not impose any maximums in terms of simulator (BATD, AATD, FTD) time that can be logged. However, it does place maximums of how many of those hours can be used as credit towards the PPL certificate.

The Federal Regulations indeed place certain limits on the amount of simulator time that can be counted towards flight training minimums. For example, the minimum hours needed to achieve the PPL is 40 hours. Of the 40 hours, the FAA allows for 2.5 hours to be used as credit towards the PPL using a qualifying simulator (FAR 61.109 [i][1]). Similarly, the FAA allows for 20 hours of the 40 hours required towards the instrument rating to be achieved on a simulator (FAR 61.65). If it is a Part 141 school, the allowances go up to 15% of the minimum time required (40 hours) which is 6 hours (Part 141, Appendix B (c)(3)) for the PPL. For the Part 141 school, for the Instrument Rating, the credit goes up to 25% if using a BATD, or 40% if using an AATD or FTD. While these are maximums that current regulations impose, it is a flaw to limit the use of the simulator to these numbers.

Let’s examine why.

Simulators provide a whole lot of value when it comes to flight training. The value earned is typically in terms of either reduced time to complete training or reduced cost of completing training.

Such value is better understood when it is broken down into direct value and indirect value. The direct value is in reduced cost that one pays for the simulator hours as compared to real-aircraft hours. The indirect value is even more important. Every hour spent on a simulator brings about learning in some form and eventually reduces the amount of real-aircraft time needed to complete training. Research has shown this over the years. Every iteration of training performed on the simulator leads to reduced iterations of practice that would be required in real-world aircraft. This reduction in ‘iterations’ leads to compressing training time while also reducing training costs.

The US national average to achieve a PPL is around 70-75 hours. It has been proven that blending simulator time into the training drops that number down to 55-60 hours. This is despite the fact that only 2.5 of those simulator hours can be used as credit towards the PPL (if Part 61 – or 6 hours for Part 141 schools). Even if we blended in 20 hours of simulator time and total training hours equaled 70 or 75, the cost of those 20 hours in a simulator is far lower than in a real-world aircraft. Given a simulator’s ability to pause, re-position, and restart scenarios at the press of a button, the number of practice iterations that can be conducted in a 90-minute slot is much higher than in a real-world aircraft.

As with anything, there is always another perspective. Ask an experienced CFI (and I did ask more than one), and one of the responses was “…personally I think PPL students need time in the airplane to learn to ‘feel’ the airplane”.

That said, there are a lot of areas in flight training that don’t require running a real-world aircraft to achieve that training. To name a few – understanding the workings of the GPS onboard an aircraft, practicing procedure under instrument failures, pattern entry, runway or taxiway markings, airspace entry and avoidance, engine-out scenarios, getting visual feedback of the rectangular pattern, descent procedures, VOR workings, DG or HSI use, and autopilot use.

Once again, most experienced CFI’s would argue that a simulator can certainly introduce an instrument failure to a student on the sim, but it’s a totally different feeling when you’re in an airplane and you lose an attitude indicator in the clouds. The CFI view on this is that simulators miss out the emotion where “suddenly the body is fighting what the eyes are telling the brain, leading you to put the airplane into a position you didn’t intend to…. it’s very hard to simulate that sensory illusion”. Another CFI went on to add about engine failures… “there’s a much different feeling you get in your gut when you’re running out of airspeed, you’re getting low and you suddenly realize you didn’t plan your approach well to the field or runway in a real airplane…”. He believes that a sim will teach the procedure and enhances skill, but the airplane combines procedure, skill, and adds the element of inherent discomfort that goes with being in that situation without having a ‘pause’ button to press.  

There is no taking away that there is a lot of teaching and learning that comes out of experiencing the imperfections of the machine.

On the contrary, the ability to experience a solo cross-country flight before it is undertaken in real-world aircraft, in certain weather conditions, and across uneven terrain gets the flying brain engaged. Building muscle memory around checklist use and proper sequence of actions in the cockpit can all be accomplished better in a simulator and help get prepared for a check-ride at much lower cost.

CFI’s agree that simulators have come a long way over the years. What this means is that the industry needs to adopt balance. It also means that there is not a ‘one size fit all’ approach. For the PPL, real-world stick time is essential to some extent. For any of the follow-on certifications, a simulator is absolutely viable and essential.

The idea till now has been that a PPL student gets 2.5 hours of value (or 6 hours as the case may be) from the simulator and the rest has to happen within a real-world aircraft. Simulators have advanced significantly over the decades. The time has come for this idea to be flipped, within limits of course, as indicated before. It may be completely possible for flight training curriculums to aim to perform the FAA-prescribed minimum time (40 minus the 2.5) in a real-world aircraft and perform the rest of the training on a simulator. Going by the national average, this would amount to 35 hours of real-world aircraft time being substituted by a simulator. Savings that quickly adds up to 3500-4000 dollars!

Hence, the next time you have access to a simulator make the most of it. If you do not have access to a simulator, make sure to find a location that has one. When in a simulator, use it to practice those aspects of flight training such as the use of the GPS that you won’t have the time or attention to work on while in a real-world training aircraft.

Simulators are time and cost compressors. Make the most of them when they are available. Do not limit your use of the simulator to maximums prescribed by the FARs. Remember, the time may not all qualify for the credit, but every hour spent on the simulator reduces your real-world aircraft time and your costs.

A shift in roles for technology

Simulators in aviation began as a training device. They were setup to help train pilots fly flying machines (as they were called in the early days of aviation). They had a role to play.

Fast forward a century…. the same technology (more advanced, no doubt!) is now used to design and test the very machine that it was to help train people for.

Flight simulators have come a long way in their evolution. This is a classic example of how the role for technology can shift 180 degrees with time. The accuracy of flight models on modern simulators is astounding. I have had the opportunity to measure and compare distinct performance parameters between real-world aircraft and a few different models of aviation training devices, and the coherence of software models to the real-world object is so precise. The picture below is an example of such a comparison. It is hard to tell which one is the real thing. Stall performance, fuel burn, climb and descent profiles, lift modeling are accurately engineered.

Instructing a computer to do all this through programming is very valuable. The next generation of this evolution has the machine learning by itself, and beyond that telling the human what to do. Indeed a powerful sequence of outcomes.

Thanks,
CP Jois

Technology and Flight Simulators

Technology, in the form of flight simulators, has changed the fundamentals of flight training.

My introduction to flight simulators dates back to 1984 with Microsoft’s Flight Simulator 2, running on an IBM PC XT. What began by chance, soon turned into a hobby, then a deep passion, and now an integral part of my purpose. The impact that this technology can have on aviation safety and pilot proficiency is immense. As described in one of my writings, when coupled with Machine Learning, this impact can be taken to a new level altogether.

While the earliest reference to a flight simulator, the ‘Sanders Teacher’, dates back to 1910 (Flight, 1910), the use of technology in flight training has increased dramatically over the years.

This image indicates an early flight simulator from 1910, the Antoinette Trainer (Flight, 1910)

Flight simulator fidelity is a multi-dimensional topic. However, visuals, touch and feel are perhaps the more dominant three. The decreasing costs of computational hardware and display technology allowed for the introduction and rapid rise of new genres of simulators that were also more affordable. These flight simulators have changed the flight training landscape. Coupled with projectors or LED TVs, the levels of visual immersion is so rich that one has to experience it to believe it.

The image below shows a comparison between the graphics of Flight Simulator 2 from around 1985 to 210 degrees of triple-channel surround projector vision built as a hobby project from about 4 years ago. It is even better now with HD projectors. The FS 2 picture actually comes from running that product on a DOS-emulator about 4-5 years ago. Hence I don’t think it looked even half as good as that back in 1985!

Not so long ago, even the very best simulators would use collimated displays where visual detail was grainy and barely sufficed. Today, even low-end basic aviation training devices come with high-quality displays that provide rich visual detail.

How technology changes everything….

Over 35 years that i have been involved with simulator technology, the flight simulator and flight training landscape has changed completely. While formal airline training programs in commercial aviation use these routinely, I find that there is tremendous opportunity in General Aviation (GA) space (for those not familiar with term, GA is everything that is not commercial air transport). In fact, the value is even higher in the GA realm given frequency of flight, long periods of time between recurrent certification and the costs aircraft use.

The potential for simulators in this realm is not fully tapped yet and presents a unique opportunity.

CP Jois

Pilot Training and Software Engineering

Pilot training focuses significantly on human factors. I strongly believe that this aspect is critical to every realm. It’s just that not all of them grant it as much focus as some industries do.

Software is more pervasive today than it has ever been. Just about everything in our lives has some element of software. It wouldn’t be that much of a stretch to state that few, if any, aspects of human life remain untouched by software code. This translated to higher stakes and increased risk from a software engineering perspective. Over the past decades, software has gone from helping with back-end data processing (remember EDP?) to real-time data streams; from supporting passive payroll processing to quadruple redundancy avionics and active-autonomous transport. That’s a big leap indeed.

However, when we think about software engineering methods, tools, and the inherent cognitive nature of software, much of it still relies on what we started with – the most important one being the human element. Software teams need to be trained to look at evolving complexity, character and impact of the software they build. However good the tools, the engineering or quality assurance methods, human factors will make the difference between success and failure.

Failure scenarios with a Simulator

Far too many times, I find that a flight simulator, even expensive FAA-certified ones are used to practice routine flying… sometimes even just as a game. That is such a poor use of a fabulous tool.

One of the more important use cases for a simulator is the ability to generate failures. This past week, I used the combination of my simulator and my PilotEdge membership to practice a failure – a GPS failure. As much as we have come to take these technologies for granted, there are days when things fail. I didn’t intend to actually fly such a failure on the simulator last week. it so happened that I filed with a flight plan with the wrong aircraft suffix /I – which stood for “No GNSS” capability (aka no GPS). When the Clearance Delivery controller confirmed with me as to whether I had no GPS equipment, I realized that I had used the wrong code. I could easily correct the code and re-file. However, I used the opportunity to note down that scenario as yet another one that all GA pilots must practice regularly. Indeed on a particular day, we may have an NAVAID outage or an equipment failure – and the need to fly without GPS that day will become real.

It was momentarily disorienting to be asked that question. Imagine actually getting ready for a flight and discovering that the Garmin 530W doesn’t turn on, or worse still, malfunctions in flight. This is exactly where practice comes in handy. Being prepared for a situation or having experienced it before makes it a lot easier to react to it when it occurs. This is exactly the use of advanced technology in flight training – getting the flying brain tuned to circumstances that are out of the ordinary.

There is a ton of technology in use in the aviation ecosystem, however, that does not mean that all elements of it will work correctly always. It is important to be prepared for the time when one of them does not.

General Aviation pilots, especially those that do not fly for a living, or are just weekend pilots must absolutely practice these scenarios.

CP Jois

AQP & Crew Resource Management

CRM began with presentation at NASA in 1979 (Bruce, Gao, & King, 2018). Born against the backdrop of the Tenerife disaster in 1977 and the United Airlines incident over Portland, Oregon in 1978, CRM has evolved and what we see today is known as 6th generation CRM (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999). Major changes have occurred between the Cockpit Resource Management of 1979 and the Crew Resource Management models of today. The primary shifts have been around scope and inclusiveness. The Colgan Air mishap in 2014 then led to a shift from passive CRM to a far more active Threat and Error model-based CRM (Holt & Poynor, 2016).

While very complex when studied in detail, stated simply, ‘Threats’ and ‘Errors’ necessitate CRM-based actions/behaviors. Fatigue is a ‘Threat’, can cause ‘Errors’, and needs CRM-based behavior to remediate or recover from the situation. Given this simplistic formulation of the model, it is pertinent that we model the various types of threats that fatigue can pose before we can bake it into the CRM/TEM training programs. Fatigue has known to cause many incidents. American 1420 in June 1999, Colgan Air 3407 in February 2009, Corporate Airlines 5966 in October 2004 are all cases where fatigue has been called out as a leading factor (Avers & Johnson, 2011) 

Unlike skill or competency training, where measurement is somewhat easier, training for behavioral responses is not all that straightforward. For example, training for a response to deal with an engine flame out on takeoff is not the same as training someone for executing a flight control maneuver. Training on factors like fatigue is more complex. On one hand, the human mechanism will not produce behaviors of an individual in a fatigued state unless they are in a state of fatigue. On the other hand, it will be a logistical challenge to get pilot resources to be a part of a simulator scenarios when they are in actually in state of fatigue. 

However, a value-additive approach to building training around fatigue-related behaviors is to first demonstrate the outcomes that fatigue can produce through simulations and scenarios. Since it is a such a strong reality of aviation today, it is worth modeling, scheduling and planning for simulator training for individuals when they are really in a state of fatigue. As an example, scheduling an intense simulator session when the circadian rhythm is in a trough is a good start. This could be further intensified by scheduling a full day of work prior to the late evening simulator session. These could induce fatigue prior to being presented with scenarios.

Fatigue like many things can only be measured through the many symptoms of fatigue it produces. The Center for Human Sciences in Farnborough, UK has developed a model for fatigue describing the symptoms of fatigue (Belyavin & Spencer, 2004). Some of them are as follows – diminished perception, a general lack of awareness; diminished motor skills and sluggish reactions; problems with short-term memory; channeled concentration, fixation on a single possibly unimportant issue, to the neglect of others; being easily distracted by unimportant matters; poor judgement; and slow decision making.

Modeling simulator scenarios that are focused on amplifying the symptoms above will yield the best results from a training perspective. Let us choose the symptom of fatigue-induced short-term memory. Modeling a high traffic congested airspace with multiple air traffic control inputs such as altitude/heading/speed changes, approach restrictions and last-minute runway changes could provide for a scenario where effects of fatigue on short term memory can be assessed.

It is important to note that not everyone reacts the same way to fatigue. While the list of symptoms is generic, each human is different. The “Swiss Cheese (Reason) model” begins to come together when a human weakness aligns with a fatigue-induced symptom and the prevailing circumstance to cause an incident (Reason, Hollnagel, & Paries, 2006). To elaborate further, if a pilot monitoring (PM) and managing communications on the flightdeck is weaker on short-term memory capacity to begin with (when compared to say, her/his motor skills), then fatigue will impact her/his ability to read back and comply with air traffic control inputs. The fatigue threat, causes memory errors, leading to the need for CRM-based recovery. Recovery in this situation could be the pilot flying (PF) noticing it and taking remedial actions. On the other hand, if one has the propensity to be weaker at motor reflexes, then fatigue would impact their ability manually control the airplane. Other scenarios could include failure annunciations to appear late in the approach requiring a quick go-around decision. Fatigue impairs decision making and such scenarios could make for good insights.  

The challenge most times is that many/most individuals aren’t aware of their weak areas and believe that they can “pull it off”. 

The value in AQP, CRM/TEM models is that they allow for the program to be setup in a way that it exposes resources to reality of these situations and more importantly allows individuals, to some degree, understand their own limitations. No amount of Powerpoint presentations will provide the experience of being in the situation, even if it is only in a simulator.

References:

Avers, K., & Johnson, W. B. (2011). A review of Federal Aviation Administration fatigue research: Transitioning scientific results to the aviation industry. Aviation Psychology and Applied Human Factors, 1(2), 87–98. https://doi-org.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/10.1027/2192-0923/a000016

Belyavin, A. J., & Spencer, M. B. (2004). Modeling performance and alertness: the QinetiQ approach. Aviation, space, and environmental medicine, 75(3), A93-A103.

Bruce, P. J., Gao, Y., & King, J. M. C. (2018;2017;). Airline operations: A practical guide (1st ed.). London, [England];New York, New York;: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315566450

Helmreich, R. L., Merritt, A. C., & Wilhelm, J. A. (1999). The evolution of crew resource management training in commercial aviation. The international journal of aviation psychology9(1), 19-32.

Holt, M. J., & Poynor, P. J. (2016). Air carrier operations (Second ed.). Newcastle, Washington: Aviation Supplies & Academics, Inc.

Reason, J., Hollnagel, E., & Paries, J. (2006). Revisiting the Swiss cheese model of accidents. Journal of Clinical Engineering, 27(4), 110-115.

Microsoft Flight Simulator 2020

For flight enthusiasts, even 40 years of using flight simulator products cannot dampen the enthusiasm and excitement of hearing that a new version of a flight simulator or a new product is being launched. The childlike excitement that builds up upon hearing of a new flight sim product is beyond words. So was the case with me as well…. although I admit that experience does bring in a little more patience. For once, I did not download MSFS2020 on August 18, the day it was launched. I waited a little for the software to settle down. Although with each passing day, my patience would ebb, and finally in the middle of September I couldn’t wait any longer and hit download!.

The installation went off with little effort, no hung machine, no crashes, etc. Although it was long download 90+ GB. I had to find a long ethernet cable to wire the PC to the router. Otherwise, despite the fast internet service I have, this download would take forever. The machine had been upgraded to Win 10, a good I7 4.2Ghz 64GB, 4GB GPU NVIDIA card, enough to run the new simulator.

Then came the time to start the simulator. I clicked on it, and the wait was long. My initial thought was that it was because the first run of any software does take a little longer. With some intro music in a loop, the -re-load was painfully long, then came the selection screen. I first set the simulator down to the barest, simplest settings. Rendering on LOW, Traffic OFF, base resolution.

The Ux is pretty intuitive. Setting up controls was not straightforward. Especially setting up the CH Yoke, a long-standing standard in simulation, was not simple. Having that out of the way, I started my first flight using a C172S. CTD!

Had to restart the simulator, another 10-15 mins gone. Flight config done, aircraft at the runway, CTD.

Reduced settings even further hopping to eliminate CTD issues, restarted the simulator. Took off from my favorite airport EDDF (Frankfurt Main). Rendering was not smooth. Tuned aliasing. Got better. However, the aircraft felt jittery and a little too much in-air movement. Being a real-world pilot who flies the Cessna 172S regularly I can say confidently that the real aircraft doesn’t feel anything like that unless there is severe turbulence. I tried to turn on auto-pilot to see if the physical controls were causing noise and hence the jitter. That did not fix the issue. Clearly, it was not something that The user or controls were causing. The jitter appeared to be in the simulator or the flight model. I made one turn on to the downwind leg. CTD.

Restarted the simulator and got the aircraft positioned. This time managed to complete one flight around the pattern.

On another flight, I used the Boeing 747-8. The aircraft booted up correctly. However, the joy was shortlived. A few minutes after takeoff, on climb-out the simulator stopped working.

The real-time traffic feature is a splendid one – however, I don’t believe it functions correctly. It is designed to use FlightAware traffic data however, at no point is the simulator reproducing any of the real-time FlightAware traffic correctly.

The color textures are very nicely done. haven’t really experienced all of the variety yet. BING Maps integration does bring an element of reality to the terrain around. It fills the void in prior simulators.

Overall, I spent 3-4 evenings using it, and then finally last weekend, I stopped wasting my time with it. I am serious about using my simulator for safety and proficiency gain. Like everyone, time is limited and I would rather use a simulation that works and gives me max benefit for the 45 mins to 90 minutes that I use it. Spending 10-12-15 mins to load up a simulator, and then not have it stay on is not a good use of time. MS or Asobo Studios needs to look at this product again. Tune it for efficiency – and ensure that it stays up. Knowing that it is software, yes, it will have some errors and will CTD at times. But that can’t be the norm.

Will wait for it to stabilize before I try it again. In the meantime, I am back to X-Plane and P3D…
CJ

Simulators during the lock-down

I write frequently about the value of flight simulators. There couldn’t be a more important time than we are in now to realize the value of a simulator.

It has something for anyone connected to aviation. For students, a simulator provides a great platform to stay proficient. For pilots, it provides the basis to avoid rust and at the same time enjoy flying while not being able to access the real aircraft and fly anywhere. For instrument rated pilots or students, it provides the opportunity to practice approaches of various types. The benefits of simulation have been long discussed here in my blog and everywhere else.

I would urge anyone with access to a simulator to use them extensively. Whether you an log the time in your logbook or not is not material. Whether you can seek credit for the time or not is not material either. Whats important is that you can use the simulator. The transfer of training benefits from a simulator are significant. If you are able to use a networked simulator with a service like PilotEdge, these benefits are further enhanced.

CJ

Air Traffic Management – what the does future hold?

It is clear that air traffic management (ATM) across the globe is changing and changing rapidly. For the past several decades ATM has remained fairly constant and while changes have occurred they have been evolutionary. However, changes that are on the anvil are revolutionary and transformational.
Regardless of whether its NextGen in the US, or SESAR in Europe or CARATS in Japan, air traffic management is about to change permanently. Each of these programs has multiple tracks and while each of these programs gives these tracks different labels, there are many similarities in their goals. Efficient flight routing, fuels savings, noise abatement, balancing separation and safety, minimizing weather impact, shifting the dependence on voice communications are examples of the goals of these initiatives.
Its evident that with such a vast slew of changes, there will be impacts from a human factors perspective. A wide variety of tests are in progress to determine the totality of these impacts. The role of the human within the operation will change. Whether its providing clearances or issuing instructions through voice communications, the role of the individual is up for change. Air traffic is increasing rapidly. Passenger volumes are on the rise. ATM is in dire need of change. The dependence on the individual is here to stay for a long time, however, the system can be designed to help rather than burden the individual. One observation that can be drawn from the videos is that ATM may be at risk of experiencing the same type of issues that aircrafts went through when large scale transformations were introduced. One of those examples is flight deck automation. While the autopilot and FMS were valuable additions to the flight deck, they brought along with them several new risks. Some of those risks continue to materialize several years after those innovations were introduced.
It is not difficult to envision these types of risks when ADS-B, ERAM, Digital Voice, Performance-based Navigation or any of the other tracks in NextGen bring major changes to ATM. All of these change programs will bring relief to roles within ATM while also bringing on new challenges.
References:
Federal Aviation Administration. (2016, May 3). FAA TV: NextGen: See, Navigate & Communicate. Retrieved from www.faa.gov: https://www.faa.gov/tv/?mediaId=1332
JAXA | 宇宙航空研究開発機構]. (2014, March 6). Next generation air-traffic management system “DREAMS”. Retrieved from
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8WvVfDqVKes (Links to an external site.)
[SESAR]. (2014, February 12). SESAR Solutions explained. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7shT5W_rI1Q

Aviation Human Factors and Prospective Memory

Prospective memory is an emerging area of research within the field of Cognitive Psychology and Human Factors. Remembering to perform intended actions can be critical, especially in safety-related occupations like Air Traffic Control.

Failures in prospective memory (PM) are the reason why we fail to perform intended or required actions. There is increasing interest in the topic of prospective memory and the reasons for failures of such memory. While this subject is still under intense debate, according to one school of thought, prospective memory recall is driven by the process of monitoring. Another view is that it occurs as part of spontaneous retrieval. In either case, the intention for the planned task is retrieved which then allows for action. Distractions are one source of why action is forgotten.

Interruptions of any kind can be a cause (Shorrock, 2005; Sternberg & Sternberg, 2016). A telephone call or request for information can be sufficient cause to not return back to the ongoing task. The variety of peripheral tasks that controllers need to perform often conflict with the primary task of maintaining separation. Such tasks could include scanning displays, accepting aircraft, gathering and relaying weather advisories and responding to pilot requests.

Prospective memory recall is predicated on cues. A cue or trigger is necessary for prospective memory to work. As described earlier, to recall the intent, the human mind constantly polls for such items. When polling is not invested in, such as when we are preoccupied with other task(s), then the intent is not recalled and action is termed as ‘forgotten’. Under another school of thought, spontaneous retrieval occurs on account of a system within our brain that causes automatic retrieval of items at the appropriate times. Once again, when tasks preoccupy, spontaneity drops and we tend to forget the intent. Proximity, recency and task regularity could all affect prospective memory (Vortac, Edwards & Manning, 1995).

In the context of ATC, prospective memory failures can prove to be catastrophic. The incident at San Francisco of a controller positioning an aircraft on the runway for takeoff, forgetting about it, and further clearing an aircraft to land on the same runway is a case in point (Loft, 2014). They can affect controller actions such as separation, scope monitoring or performing other tasks such as flight strip updates, aircraft transfer, peer collaboration and shift transitions. Inaccurate recall of information on a strip, failing to observe conflicts and failure to annotate strips correctly are all examples of PM failures. Controllers may intend correctly but then fail to follow through on that thinking because they simply “forgot to do so”. In the realm of ATC, cues are either based on time or based on events (Loft, 2014; McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). However, monitoring takes a cost in the form of “brain cycles” and therefore impacts performance. Such impacts could come in the form of slowing down a certain action in order to devote time to monitoring.

External cues are an effective way to mitigate the risks of prospective memory failure (Vortac & Edwards, 1995). Memory aids are useful and can be any tool, prop or other aid that could serve as a reminder (FAA Video, 2015). They need to be incorporated into the routine though and not be ad-hoc. Mnemonics and placards are one way to avoid prospective memory errors (Loft, 2014; Stein, 1991). Using free text to jot down notes is another option. Memory aids must be effective. A good example from the video is that of holding a strip in hand as a reminder when there is a vehicle inspecting the runway. There is a growing interest in having the system alert and warn if an action is overdue. The sophistication available today makes it possible to code rules into the system and have it warn the controller. However, this may lead to the same type of over dependence on automation and sense of complacency that we find occur in pilots.

References
Federal Aviation Administration. (2015, September 02). Retrieved April 25, 2017, from https://www.faa.gov/tv/?mediaId=1151 (Links to an external site.)
Federal Aviation Administration. (2015, September 02). Retrieved April 25, 2017, from https://www.faa.gov/tv/?mediaId=1152 (Links to an external site.)
Loft, S. (2014). Applying psychological science to examine prospective memory in simulated air traffic control. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 23(5), 326-331.
McDaniel, M. A.. & Einstein G. (2007). Prospective Memory. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/erau/detail.action?docID=996509
Shorrock, S. T. (2005). Errors of memory in air traffic control. Safety science, 43(8), 571-588.
Stein, E. S., & Federal Aviation Administration Technical Center (U.S.). (1991). Air traffic controller memory: A field survey. (). Springfield, Va;Atlantic City International Airport, N.J;: Federal Aviation Administration Technical Center.
Sternberg, R. J., & Sternberg, K. (2016). Cognitive psychology. Nelson Education.
Vortac, O. U., Edwards, M. B., & Manning, C. A. (1995). Functions of external cues in prospective memory. Memory, 3(2), 201-219.